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point, there is a strong consensus that while MFN provisions can lead to procom-
petitive outcomes or at least play a competitively neutral role, they may also result
in competitive harm and a loss of consumer welfare. Therefore, US and EU
enforcement agencies and courts have held that MFNs should be reviewed on a
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best use of their limited resources and that of practitioners seeking to advise their
clients. Accordingly, published guidelines on the use of MFNs, containing pre-
sumptions and safe harbors, would be both efficient and useful. The paper argues
that it would increase the efficiency and accuracy of antitrust enforcement if one of
the leading competition authorities issued MFN guidelines. The paper suggests a set
of presumptions and safe harbors that should be included in any such guidelines.
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The so-called most favored nation (MFN) or most favored customer clauses (MFC)
are essentially agreements between a supplier and a customer whereby the supplier
promises the customer that it will grant it equally favorable terms as granted to any
other customer.1 MFNs are often employed in vertical relationships between firms
involved in complicated distribution chains across many sectors, including energy,
insurance, health, film distribution, retail goods and many more.2
Despite their various efficiency generating functions, MFN provisions can
nevertheless lead to competitive harm, loss of consumer welfare and higher
consumer prices. As will be discussed more extensively below, the potential
competitive concerns associated with MFNs generally fall into three categories: (1)
reduced price competition, (2) facilitating collusion between competitors, and (3)
exclusionary effect on rivals at the buyer level.
To date, while there have been a number of visible antitrust cases surrounding
MFNs, there is little concrete legal guidance available on the day-to-day use of MFNs
and no guidelines adopted in any of the jurisdictions. Given the complex nature of the
effects of MFN clauses on competition, analyzing the impact of MFN clauses can pose
challenges for both regulatory authorities and businesses and practitioners. One way to
deal with the complex landscape presented by MFN arrangements would be for
competition authorities or courts to undertake a separate rule of reason analysis with
respect to each and every case. However, proceeding purely on the basis of case law,
without the help of secondary legislation, has several important disadvantages, and in
our view, constitutes a an impractical alternative. To that end, this paper argues that
competition authorities seeking to make the best use of their limited resources and the
available evidence, and practitioners seeking to advise their clients in the most
effective manner, would benefit from a guideline that sets out the different forms of
MFNs along with guidance in terms of presumptions and safe harbors regarding
circumstances in which MFNs are more or less likely to lead to anticompetitive harm
from the point of view of the enforcement agency.
This paper first argues for the need for a guideline in comparison to the case-by-
case approach observed in most jurisdictions, and proposes a structure of useful
elements such a guideline should cover. Within the context of a model guideline, we
then introduce a theoretical discussion of the potential positive and negative
economic effects of MFN clauses on competition, drawing on the existing economic
literature and antitrust case law to illustrate the relevant effects, as we believe it is
important for a guideline to offer a sound theoretical background to provide context
for more specific guidance. We then identify certain market dynamics or contractual
characteristics which present a strong risk of anti-competitive effects and possible
presumptions of illegality in order to provide more specific guidance and greater
legal transparency. Finally, the paper suggests a set of safe harbors that should be
included in any such guideline.
Throughout the paper, we conduct our analysis by distinguishing between two
types of MFN clauses. As provided above, ‘‘traditional’’ MFN clauses are
1 As MFNs and MFCs are of the same nature, this article refers to these types of clauses as MFNs.
2 Particularly, various academic sources have noted the prevalence of MFN clauses or similar structures
in long-term energy contracts see Crocker and Lyon (1994), Mulherin (1986), Canes and Norman (1986).
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provisions in which a seller promises the recipient that it will provide the best price
or the most favorable sale conditions. Much of the recent antitrust attention has
focused on a similar but slightly different contractual structure. In the case of the so-
called retail MFNs3 or platform MFNs,4 a seller who markets products through a
platform guarantees the platform operator that it will not offer the same products for
a cheaper price or more advantageous terms through another platform. As will be
discussed further below, in only the last few years, retail MFNs have been
scrutinized by the US Justice Department, the European Commission, as well as the
national competition authorities of various EU member states in a variety of sectors
such as online hotel bookings, online sale of e-books, and price comparison
websites for motor insurance.
Unsurprisingly, retail MFN provisions have usually been utilized in combination
with an agency model where the suppliers remain in control of the prices offered
through the platform, and the platform realizes its revenues through taking a
commission on the sale.5 In our analysis of retail MFNs, we will generally proceed
under the assumption of an agency model.
1 The need for a clear guideline for MFN clauses
1.1 The advantages of a guideline and a potential structure
The US and European enforcement agencies have so far reviewed MFNs on a case-
by-case basis. However, a case-by-case analysis of MFNs creates challenges for
businesses and legal practitioners due to the necessity for extensive legal research
created as a result, and the limitation of the guidance to the issues presented in the
relevant cases.
Businesses that are engaged in commercial negotiations with respect to a wide
variety of parameters have a pressing need to reach business decisions quickly and
the widespread use of MFNs in numerous industries shows that they are a common
tool that businesses rely upon. To that end, gleaning through isolated decisions in
order to come to a conclusion about the legality of a given business decision may
translate into delays which increase transaction costs and may even threaten the
successful conclusion of deals which are under intense time pressure. While it is
understood that businesses will proceed under legal advice from professional
practitioners, a singular guideline which sets forth clear criteria (such as, safe
harbors, presumptions of illegality and primary competition law concerns, etc.) will
also offer distinct advantages for the legal practitioner in terms of timing and cost.
Indeed, the existence of a guideline would also make it easier for practitioners to
3 A retail MFN or a retail price MFN seems to be the more common terminology, used inter alia by the
European Commission, as well as commentators such as Johnson (2014).
4 This terminology is used by Boik and Corts (2013).
5 A supplier and a platform could also work through a resale model where the platform purchases the
relevant products from the supplier, paying a wholesale price, and resells them for the prices it
independently determines. However, this model would make a retail MFN difficult to observe for a
supplier as it no longer has control over retail prices.
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spot possible legal issues in advance. This is particularly true in civil law settings
where legal practitioners are used to proceeding primarily on the basis of legal
instruments rather than case law.
Even in the case of advanced competition law regimes, such as the US and EU, the
number of decisions concerning (traditional and retail) MFN clauses are relatively
few, despite the recent and increasing level of attention on retail MFNs in particular.
Furthermore, the precedential value of some of the existing cases is complicated by the
fact that they have been resolved by commitments or consent decree procedures which
do not result in a formal finding of a violation. For instance, in the case of the EU, past
enforcement efforts concerning MFN clauses have ceased without formal proceedings
due to voluntary elimination of the relevant clauses,6 or, as in the case of the e-books
case, in a commitment decision, which also does not constitute a finding of a
competition law infringement even though it is binding.
The preparation of a guideline will also benefit competition authorities as,
through a guideline, the case handlers of competition authorities will themselves
have access to clear-cut criteria which will minimize the chances of investigations
concerning cases that do not present competition law concerns, allowing the
competition authority to conserve its resources for more important cases and allow
for efficiency in case load management.
The preparation of a guideline which offers the opportunity to highlight the
relevant competition law issues in a complete manner and in an ex ante basis
therefore seems to be the much more advantageous alternative from an ideal
antitrust compliance/enforcement perspective compared to leaving the treatment of
MFN clauses to the eventual unfolding of case law. This is because the preparation
of a guideline would (1) reduce legal delays and transaction costs through providing
guidance on potential legal issues in a manner which can be easily accessed, (2)
reduce legal uncertainties especially for relatively young competition law jurisdic-
tions where the case law may not yet be sufficiently developed, and (3) allow
competition authorities to conserve their resources by eliminating non-problematic
cases easily as a result of safe harbors identified by the relevant guideline.
In line with the need for greater predictability and a singular source of
information which is both comprehensive and easily accessible, we argue that a
guideline should provide the following main elements:
1. Definitions of restrictions encompassed within the concept of MFN;
2. Theoretical discussion of general antitrust concerns posed by MFN clauses and
market dynamics or contractual characteristics which present a strong risk of
anti-competitive effects and possible presumptions of illegality;
3. Efficiencies and justifications which may be created by MFN clauses and
particular contexts where they may be pro-competitive;
4. Safe harbors which set out under which conditions the presence of MFN clauses
are unlikely to lead to any competition law concerns and therefore should be
presumed legal by the courts and/or competition authorities.
6 These cases include Pay TV (2004), Ruhrgas/Gazprom (2005), Theater Digitalization (2011).
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For the sake of clarity, these elements should not be thought of as an exhaustive
list, but as the essential terms of a model. Based on the points of convergence in
existing case law in different jurisdictions and the academic literature on MFN
clauses, below we propose the content of the various issues outlined in the above
headings.
One legitimate inquiry for jurisdictions that follow the EU approach and exempt
certain vertical agreements entirely from the application of the competition law
would be whether the MFN clauses benefit from the Vertical Block Exemption
Regulation (‘‘VBER’’) (or from a similar vertical block exemption regulation
adopted under local law), and if so, whether there would still be a need for an MFN
guideline. For this reason, before we provide our recommendations on the content of
a model guideline on the MFNs in the following section, we initially provide some
discussion on whether MFN clauses should benefit from the VBER, and if so, how
the model MFN guideline should interplay with the VBER (or a similar block
exemption regulation formulated for vertical agreements).
1.2 Would MFN clauses benefit from regulations such as the Vertical Block
Exemption Regulation?
In jurisdictions, such as the EU, vertical agreements that satisfy certain criteria can
be exempted from the application of the competition law. Take, for instance, the
VBER that is currently enforced in the EU. So long as the parties to the agreement
operate at different levels (one supplier and the other purchaser) of a supply chain
and so long as their individual market share in the relevant market does not exceed a
certain threshold (i.e. 30 %), VBER would allow the parties’ agreement to be
exempt from the application of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (‘‘TFEU’’). Under the VBER, hardcore restrictions, such as
resale price maintenance (‘‘RPM’’), would not be exempted.
As MFN clauses are essentially vertical restraints, they are theoretically subject
to the VBER and the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. Article 2 of the VBER
provides that ‘‘pursuant to Article 101(3) of the Treaty and subject to the provisions
of this Regulation, it is hereby declared that Article 101(1) of the Treaty shall not
apply to vertical agreements.’’ Given that the above provision provides a blanket
exemption for vertical agreements subject to certain exceptions, vertical agreements
between a supplier and the purchaser of the relevant good or service which contains
an MFN clause would be exempted from the scope of Article 101(1) of the TFEU
subject to the provisions of the VBER.7 Against the foregoing, it can be argued that
as vertical restrictions, MFN clauses stand to benefit from the block exemption
provided by the VBER. On the other hand, as of yet, this conclusion has not been
confirmed in any Commission decision.
7 With respect to scope, Article 3 of the VBER provides that the block exemption is only applicable to
those agreements where ‘‘the market share held by the supplier does not exceed 30 % of the relevant
market on which it sells the contract goods or services and the market share held by the buyer does not
exceed 30 % of the relevant market on which it purchases the contract goods or services.’’ Furthermore,
pursuant to Article 2 (4), VBER does not apply to vertical agreements between competitors.
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Similarly, neither the VBER nor the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints provide
specific guidance concerning MFN clauses. In fact, the VBER does not mention
MFN clauses at all, while the Guideline on Vertical Restraints includes only the
following reference in paragraph 48 which concerns RPM:
Similarly, direct or indirect price fixing can be made more effective when
combined with measures which may reduce the buyer’s incentive to lower the
resale price, such as the supplier printing a recommended resale price on the
product or the supplier obliging the buyer to apply a most-favored-customer
clause. The same indirect means and the same ‘supportive’ measures can be
used to make maximum or recommended prices work as RPM.
While the above language notes the RPM-related competitive concerns arising
out of a supplier obliging the buyer to apply a MFC clause, it does not shed any light
on the treatment of the use of MFN clauses in and of themselves.
It has been suggested by the German Federal Cartel Office (‘‘FCO’’) that MFNs
could potentially be considered within the scope of Article 4(a) of the VBER
concerning resale price maintenance, and therefore as a hard-core restriction that
does not benefit from the block exemption, though this was ultimately left open
(FCO 2013c, para. 181 et seq.). In this respect, the FCO acknowledged that the
restrictions in question are not covered by a strict reading of the wording of Article
4(a) (FCO 2013c. Para. 183) as the clauses do not restrict the resale price of a buyer.
Nevertheless, the FCO argues that the competitive effect of the MFN clauses is
similar in character to the vertical price maintenance covered under the relevant
article (FCO 2013c. para. 184–185). As the market share of HRS in the relevant
market exceeded 30 % and HRS did not benefit from the VBER, the FCO ultimately
left open the question of whether MFN clauses are hard-core restrictions.
However, such an interpretation is open to criticism for being too expansive as
MFN clauses do not necessarily limit the resale price of the buyer in a vertical
relationship but in fact impose a pricing limitation on the supplier. Furthermore, an
MFN clause does not formally restrict the ability to discount but merely obliges a
supplier to offer the same discount to the buyer (although this obligation can create
an incentive not to offer discounts).
The FCO also elaborated on its stance towards the use of retail MFNs in its
‘‘Vertical Restraints in the Internet Economy: Meeting of the Working Group on
Competition Law’’ paper (FCO 2013a) which was published about two months
before the HRS decision. In its discussion of MFN and price parity clauses, the FCO
emphasizes that MFN clauses reference the prices of competitors, and therefore they
go beyond a mere vertical restraint and have a horizontal dimension (FCO 2013a).
In its enforcement history against the use of MFN clauses, the European
Commission has taken action against the use of MFN clauses in cases where it
deemed that they were being used to facilitate a horizontal agreement or concerted
practice (e.g. the e-books case—discussed below), or cases where their use was so
widespread that the cumulative effects threatened to create exclusionary effects (e.g.
the theater digitalization case—discussed below) or cause the harmonization of
commercial terms (e.g. Pay TV 2004). The most recent investigation conducted by
the Commission against Amazon, launched in June 2015, also illustrates the
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Commission’s stance on MFN clauses. Its probe will arguably also consider whether
Amazon’s contractual arrangements with publishers lead to the exclusion of
Amazon’s competitors given that according to the Commission, Amazon is the
largest e-books distributor in Europe. The Commission launched the investigation
due to Amazon’s contractual MFN-type clauses with publishers concerning
Amazon’s sale of e-books. The press release provides that the clauses allow
Amazon: (1) the right to be informed of more favorable or alternative terms offered
to its competitors; and (2) the right to terms and conditions at least as good as those
offered to its competitors. The Commission will investigate whether ‘‘such clauses
may hinder the level playing field and potentially decrease competition between
different e-book distributors to the detriment of consumers’’ (Amazon 2015).
Considering the above arguments raised, it is inevitable that MFNs may or may
not benefit from VBER (or a similar block exemption regulation formulated for
vertical agreements). We argue that in cases where the relevant jurisdiction does not
have a block exemption regulation formulated for vertical agreements or that the
relevant authority finds that MFNs are hard-core restrictions that are not exempt by
the relevant block exemption regulation, then the model guideline on MFNs becomes
ever more useful. Needless to say, however, as a number of jurisdictions including
the EU have block exemption regulation formulated for vertical agreements, the
more important question is whether in case the MFN clauses benefit from the vertical
exemption regulation, how would that interact with the model MFN guideline.
In case where the MFNs were to benefit from the VBER, the guideline could for
instance provide the circumstances in which MFNs benefit from the VBER, and
distinguish cases that do not benefit from the VBER. An alternative could be that the
vertical exemption regulation could be amended to clarify the recent case law on the
MFNs and take a position on the types of MFNs that would be exempt by the
vertical block exemption regulation, and distinguish cases, such as, for example,
MFN-plus arrangements, that may not benefit from the block exemption.
2 Proposed content for a model guideline
2.1 Definitions of MFNs
As provided above, an MFN clause has been traditionally defined as an agreement by
which the seller agrees that the buyer will receive terms that are at least as favorable as
those offered to any other buyer (Stenger 1989; Dennis 1995). However, with the
popularization of retail MFNs in multi-sided markets, a different structure has been
added to the rubric of ‘‘MFNs.’’ Indeed, in many cases commentators have not
distinguished between traditional MFNs and retail MFNs despite the differences in
structure and therefore certain differences in terms of effect on competition.8
The so-called retail MFN clauses used in the e-books investigations (i.e.
guarantees by suppliers to platform operators that the relevant supplier shall not
8 For example, Salop and Scott Morton reference the clauses used in the e-books case simply as MFNs
without making an MFN/retail MFN distinction (Salop and Scott Morton 2013).
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offer the relevant goods for more advantageous terms in rival platforms) do not fit
the narrow description provided above but have been embraced under the rubric of
‘‘MFN.’’ Similarly, best price guarantees across sellers (also known as ‘‘meeting the
competition clauses’’ or ‘‘best price clauses’’) have sometimes been referred to as
MFNs.9
The presence of potentially divergent terminologies makes it a helpful attribute
for a guideline to define the concept of ‘‘MFN’’ clause and its scope at the outset.
While a guideline could simply focus on the traditional and retail MFNs, as we do
below, a guideline could also embrace a much wider scope and also explain similar
provisions which ‘‘reference prices of rivals’’ such as across-seller price guarantees,
English clauses, etc. Either way, to preserve the conceptual clarity and prevent the
conflation of the competitive effects of different types of provisions, the definitions
of the examined provisions should be clear.
2.2 General antitrust concerns posed by MFN clauses and market dynamics
or contractual characteristics which present a strong risk of anti-
competitive effects
2.2.1 General discussion of anti-competitive concerns posed by MFNs
As Dennis (1995) points out, MFN clauses do not merely affect the relationship
between the buyer and the seller: ‘‘By implicating the commercial relationships of
other buyers, MFN clauses can indirectly affect the price structure of the entire
marketplace as well as everyone in it’’ (Dennis 1995, p.77). Fiona Scott Morton,
formerly of the U.S. Department of Justice, later expanded on this concept in
defining a category of ‘‘Contracts that Reference Rivals,’’ which have a potential to
harm consumers and competition, ‘‘particularly when they involve firms with
market power’’ (Scott Morton 2012, p.3).
MFN clauses cannot be viewed statically and independent of the effects they may
have on the rest of the market. As a result, it is important for a potential guideline to
provide a sound theoretical background regarding the relevant risks for effective
guidance.
The potential harms that can be wrought by MFNs generally fall into three
categories: (1) reduced price competition, (2) exclusion, and (3) facilitating
collusion. The above three concerns arise for both traditional MFNs and retail
MFNs, though as will be discussed below, the relevant mechanisms through which
this effect is realized may change.
1. Reduced price competition
Baker and Chevalier (2013) describe how MFNs can operate as a ‘‘tax’’ on price-
cutting by the seller. The MFN operates so that any price-cutting by the seller
9 For example, Crocker and Lyon (1994) refer to across-seller best price guarantees as three-party-most-
favored-nation-guarantees (3PMFN) and includes both traditional MFNs (referred to as two-party-most-
favorite nation-clauses (2PMFN) and 3PMFNs in the following discussion of rationales for the use of
MFNs. See also Jacobson and Weick (2012).
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anywhere in the market becomes more expensive, because it must also cut the prices
to the buyer with the MFN. The seller may well lose more profit by entering into an
agreement with a small buyer at a low price than by not engaging with that buyer at
all or by offering only a higher price. The same effect has been described in other
words by a variety of commentators: Cernak and Chaiken (2013) describe it as
‘‘price stickiness’’ (reluctance by the seller to compete on price, which increases
with the number of MFNs) (Cernak and Chaiken, p.2); Jacobson and Weick (2012)
refer to ‘‘stabilizing prices at elevated levels’’ (Jacobson and Weick 2012, p. 6); and
Dennis (1995) refers to ‘‘setting a price floor’’ whereby ‘‘no one is able to obtain a
better price… than the dominant [buyer]’’ (Dennis 1995, p. 80).
The ability of MFN clauses to stifle price competition is magnified when the
relevant MFN provision is retroactive. This is because in this scenario, a discount to
one buyer would have to be matched not only with respect to contemporaneous buyers
but also past purchases, resulting in a particularly high cost associated with
discounting (Salop and Scott Morton 2013). The same is true where an MFN clause
includes an additional penalty, such as paying the buyer with an MFN several times the
difference between the price received and a better price offered to another customer.
Scott Morton (1997) provides empirical evidence of how traditional MFNs
dampen price competition and raise prices. The relevant study examines the effects
of the adoption of an MFN protecting Medicaid in regard to medical reimburse-
ments through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. She finds that, as a
response to the shift in policy, the average price of a branded drug facing generic
competition rose by about 4 % (Scott Morton 1997, p. 288). With respect to the
prices of generic pharmaceuticals facing competition from branded products, she
finds that ‘‘those in concentrated markets, with large package sizes and high sales to
Medicaid, had significant price increases’’ (Scott Morton 1997, p. 289).10 As noted
by Aguzzoni et al. (2012), not only do Scott Morton’s result demonstrates an
increase in price, but also a correlation between price increase effects and
characteristics which would incentivize such an increase under theoretical models.
These characteristics include a high share for the protected buyer (e.g. Medicaid),
high price dispersion before the introduction of the MFNs and large package sales
which are likely to have lower unit prices which would make it more likely for the
MFN to kick in (Scott Morton 1997, p. 279–280; Aguzzoni et al. 2012, p. 65–66).
Competitive concerns arise in a similar way for retail MFNs. Assume, for
example a platform that tries to undercut the competing dominant platform by
including cheaper offers on its own platform. Without the retail MFN, it could strike
a bargain whereby it accepts a lower commission on the offer and the supplier in
turn offers a lower price in the relevant platform without sacrificing its own profit.
However, where other platforms are protected by a retail MFN, the supplier could
lower its price in one platform only where it also lowers them in the protected
platforms regardless of whether they have reduced their commissions, likely
sacrificing a significant amount of profits.
10 The distinction between generic and branded drugs in the analysis stems from the fact that generic
drugs were not covered within the scope of the MFN protection, even though they still faced a price cap in
the amount of 90 % of their average price (Scott Morton 1997, 275).
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The potential for retail MFNs to dampen price competition has been a major
element of the recent antitrust scrutiny of such clauses. In its investigation of the
online hotel booking platform, HRS, the FCO stated: ‘‘The freedom of price setting
of the hotels and that of the hotel portals is equally negatively affected: The MFN
clauses prevent the hotels from offering rooms at lower prices, and for the [hotel
portals] there is no economic incentive for charging lower commissions’’ (FCO
2013c. para 186). HRS offered brokerage services to hotels against a commission
based on the rooms booked via the website, i.e. worked under the agency model.
HRS had imposed an MFN on the participating hotels that required the hotels inter
alia to treat HRS no less favorably than other online booking platforms which
prohibited the hotels from offering cheaper rates elsewhere, including the hotels’
own website as well as offline channels such as a deal through the hotel’s own
reception desk (FCO 2013c, para. 173). As a result of these obligations, hotels could
not pass on the effect of lower commissions to the customers, even where another
agent chose to sacrifice its commission in order to include a better offer.
The FCO reasoned that through preventing the hotels from achieving more
flexibility in their pricing, the retail MFNs affected not only the competition
between the agents (i.e. intra-brand competition) but also the competition between
the hotels (inter-brand competition). According to the antitrust agency, the effect of
the retail MFNs was strengthened by the fact that other main online travel agents,
Booking.com and Expedia, also used similar retail MFNs (FCO 2013c, para. 174).
Ultimately, the FCO ordered HRS to simply delete the retail MFN clauses from
its contractual terms and discontinue their use (FCO 2013b). The FCO also extended
its investigation to Booking.com and Expedia based on similar retail MFN clauses.
The United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority’s (‘‘CMA’’) Private
Motor Insurance Market Investigation Final Report, addressing, among other things,
retail MFN provisions between private motor insurance (‘‘PMI’’) providers and
price comparison websites (‘‘PCW’’) also demonstrates findings regarding the
potential of retail MFNs to soften price competition (CMA 2014). In its analysis, the
CMA differentiated between the use of ‘‘narrow MFN clauses’’ (ensuring the
relevant PCW that the insurance provider will not provide better prices on its own
website) and ‘‘wide MFN clauses’’ (ensuring the PCW that the price offered by an
insurer in the relevant PCW is at least as good as that offered on any other PCW as
well as the insurer’s own website).
Particularly, the CMA stated: ‘‘We found that wide MFN clauses soften price
competition between PCWs in relation to PMI. (…)There is little incentive for a
PCW facing a competitor with a wide MFN clause to seek better PMI prices for
their retail consumers from insurers because that better price would be passed on to
the competitor also.’’ (CMA 2014, para. 58). The CMA also found that wide MFNs
would lessen incentives for innovation which lowers operational costs by PCWs as
these advantages could not be passed on the customers through cheaper offers and
thus enable the PCW to gain market share (CMA 2014, para. 59, para. 8.41). The
wide retail MFN clauses were also found to enable the PCWs to squeeze providers
for higher commissions as the providers would not be able to respond by increasing
the premiums of the offers in the relevant platform (CMA 2014, para. 8.40). The
CMA also found evidence of PMI providers turning down offers for reductions in
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price and commission reductions due to wide MFN arrangements in place with other
PCWs. (CMA 2014, para. 59).
The CMA also speculated on whether narrow retail MFNs could also dampen
competition between PCWs; however, it found that narrow-MFNs were unlikely to
have such an effect (CMA 2014, para. 8.54), mainly due to the fact that insurers
with significant sales through the direct channel were generally not listed on PCWs
and were already unlikely to offer low-price/low-commission offers in PCWs
regardless of the presence of narrow-MFNs (CMA 2014, para. 8.51, 8.53). Boik and
Corts (2013) study the effect of adoption of retail MFNs (referred to as platform
MFNs by the authors) on price levels under an agency model with a single seller
selling through one or both of two platforms. The authors find that equilibrium ‘‘fees
and prices are higher when both platforms have [platform MFN] agreements’’ (Boik
and Corts 2013, p.6). Indeed, according to the authors’ model fees and prices with
retail MFNs in place turn out to be even higher than those which would be chosen
by perfectly colluding platforms (Boik and Corts 2013, p. 6–7). Johnson (2014) also
finds that the combination of retail MFNs and the agency model is associated with
higher retail prices, and lower consumer surplus (Johnson 2014, p. 16).
2. Exclusion
MFNs can also lead to anticompetitive exclusion by raising rivals’ costs or by
otherwise raising the barriers to entry (see, e.g. Baker and Chevalier 2013, Aguzzoni
et al. 2012). By securing an MFN, a buyer will have guaranteed for itself the lowest
price available in the market. If the MFN relates to the price of an intermediate
good, the clause may raise rivals’ costs. That is, if the buyer with the MFN is
sufficiently large, it will not be profit-maximizing for the seller to offer a lower price
to other market participants, knowing that it will then have to also offer the lower
price to the MFN-protected buyer. With higher costs, barriers to entry are higher and
the buyer with the MFN has secured or improved its market position. Dennis (1995)
describes how ‘‘[t]he large book of business that [healthcare] providers enjoy
courtesy of the dominant insurer is economically more valuable than realizing an
increase in patient volume originating from a competing plan.’’ (Dennis 1995, p.78).
In the case of a retail MFN, the buyer will have eliminated the possibility of price
competition from its actual or potential competitors. New entrants may be less able
to compete with an existing firm without the possibility of competing on price
terms.
This exclusionary effect may be particularly significant where suppliers may
have reason to offer low prices to financially weaker newcomers in the interest of
future business, or where the markets include segments of customers with lesser
financial strength for some other reason. The European Commission’s Theatre
Digitalization preliminary investigation includes a good depiction of this situation.
The relevant case concerns the use of MFN provisions in the contracts between
major film studios and contractors that carried out the digitalization of movie
theaters. The contractors, referred to as ‘‘integrators’’, purchase the necessary
equipment for switching to digital technology and install it in the movie theaters.
Under the virtual print fee (‘‘VPF’’) business model adopted by the major studios,
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the studios would each pay a fee every time a digital film was shown in the specific
movie theater, constituting the major part of the integrator’s payment. The cinema
owner would also contribute to financing the digitalization through an upfront
payment to the integrator. The integrator, in turn, would cover its business risk by
retaining ownership of the equipment until its payment was completed (Theater
Digitalization 2011). The MFN clauses in question guaranteed a studio/distributor
the right to benefit from the most favorable terms that the integrator had agreed with
any other studio/distributor, including the level of VPF payments made by the
studio/distributor.
The Commission initiated a preliminary investigation based on its concern that
the widespread use of MFN clauses between the studios and integrators could have
the effect of preventing ‘‘integrators from signing contracts with distributors of
independent/art house films whose business models differed from the major
Hollywood film studios’’ (Theater Digitalization 2011). According to the Commis-
sion, the MFN clauses could create an incentive not to offer advantageous terms to
independent distributors (who may only be able to take part in the digitalization
process under more favorable terms), as the integrator would need to match any
discount in its dealings with the major studios. Ultimately, the Commission ended
its preliminary investigation without initiating formal proceedings due to the major
film studios’ willingness to modify their contracts.
The Commission’s stance is particularly noteworthy as the relevant MFN clauses
were not found to have an anti-competitive purpose. In fact, in its press release
concerning the preliminary investigation, the Commission noted that ‘‘the stated
rationale of these provisions was to ensure that competitors (primarily the other
major Hollywood film studios) would not contribute less to the digital switchover
while getting equal access to the digital projection equipment in European cinemas’’
(Theater Digitalization 2011). Despite noting these pro-competitive effects, the
Commission nevertheless took the position that the potentially exclusionary effect
on independent film distributors was more pressing, and asked the parties to revise
their contracts, removing the MFN clause.
The above case constitutes a good example of how an MFN clause can have
exclusionary effects through raising the costs of rivals for a key input. Integrators
expected to realize the majority of their payments through major Hollywood
studios. However, absent the MFN clauses, it would still have been rational for them
to price discriminate and offer better terms to those independent distributors with
lesser resources (and therefore lower reservation prices) as long as the terms were
still profitable from their perspective. The MFN clause would drastically change
these dynamics and effectively constitute a ‘‘tax’’ in the amount of foregone profits
through accepting lower VPF payments from major studios, likely preventing the
transactions with independent studios.
The recent litigation in the US against Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of
Michigan, also illustrates the alleged use of an MFN clause to raise the costs of
competitors and thereby gain a competitive advantage. The DOJ filed a complaint in
2010, challenging the MFN clauses used by BCBS. According to the complaint,
BCBS was the dominant health insurance company in Michigan, with a 60 %
market share. BCBS obtained MFN provisions in its contracts with health providers
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that typically required hospital providers to provide BCBS with lower rates than
they offered to any other insurer, which the DOJ referred to as ‘‘MFN plus’’
provisions. The DOJ alleged that BCBS had MFN provisions in its contracts with at
least 70 of Michigan’s 131 general acute-care hospitals. The complaint described
two mechanisms of harm: first, that the providers obtained higher rates in exchange
for agreeing to the MFNs, and second, that the MFNs raised the barriers to entry by
precluding potential competitors from competing with BCBS on price (specifically,
by offering narrower provider networks in exchange for lower prices). The DOJ’s
complaint survived a motion to dismiss, with the district court holding that the
allegations of anticompetitive harm were (at least) plausible (United States v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan) However, after more than two years of litigation, the
Michigan state legislature passed a law banning the use of MFNs by hospitals or
health insurers, mooting the DOJ’s lawsuit, which was then dismissed. A private
claim filed against BCBS in relation to the same claim was settled.
Exclusionary effects on competing undertakings also emerge as an important
concern in the case of retail MFNs. As discussed in the above section regarding
reduced price competition, a retail MFN hinders suppliers from rewarding platforms
charging lower commissions through lower offers on their platform. This in turn
prevents new entrants from establishing themselves in the market through a low-
cost/low-price model (Oxera 2014).
This effect is confirmed by Boik and Corts 2013 whose economic model predicts
that retail MFN provisions may either deter the entry of competitors seeking to
adopt a low-cost/low-price model or skew their choice of business model towards a
high price/high value one. That said, the authors find that the incentives for entry
increase for competitors who already seek to enter based on a high price/high value
model due to the high prices which prevail in the market as a result of retail MFNs.
The potential to foreclose rivals has been one of the main points of concern in
antitrust investigations concerning retail MFNs. For example, in the above-
mentioned HRS decision, the FCO alleges that ‘‘the MFN clauses furthermore
impede the market access of new competitors’’ (FCO 2013c, para. 160) through
preventing access to cheaper offers through lower commissions or another strategy
which is advantageous for the hotels. In this respect, FCO points to the example of
Justbook, a new mobile reservation channel, which offered more advantageous
terms to hotels but whose request for cheaper room offers was nevertheless refused
due to the presence of retail MFNs protecting HRS.
Similar effects were also noted by the CMA which stated that its analysis
‘‘suggested that wide MFNs will make it hard for an entrant to adopt a
differentiated, low-premium entry strategy’’ (CMA 2014, 8.69). As evidence of
this claim, the CMA examined the failure to enter the market by Covea SGAM.
According to Covea SGAM’s market analysis, the downside risks were too high to
justify level of investment required to launch a full scale operation in the UK unless
it could enter under a differentiated business model. The undertaking was barred
from pursuing a low-price strategy through the existence of wide MFNs, and did not
enter the market as it found differentiation based on marketing to be unpromising.
The exclusionary effects of retail MFNs are indirectly supported by the dynamics
of multi-sided markets where they are often utilized. Multi-sided markets are
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characterized by indirect network effects whereby the demand faced by the platform
operator on one side is dependent on the number of users on the other side
(Samuelson et al. 2012, p.1). The presence of indirect network effects has been
argued to make market entry more difficult, therefore leading to highly concentrated
structures in the case of multi-sided markets. (OECD Report, p.98, 115; Samuelson
et al. 2012, p.1) In the same vein, Evans (2013) emphasizes the importance of
reaching a ‘‘critical mass’’ of users for the viability of a platform business.
According to the author’s definition ‘‘critical mass is the amount of demand on both
sides that is sufficient to generate positive feedback effects’’ (Evans 2013, p.18).
Platforms that reach this level are able to trigger positive feedback effects which
propel them towards growth. However, ‘‘based on casual evidence it appears that
most new platforms do not make it through this initiation phase’’ (Evans 2013,
p.19).
Against this background, the possibility of product differentiation emerges as one
of the main ways to facilitate entry into a multi-sided market. Indeed, as Evans
states ‘‘product differentiation is a key reason why many industries with multi-sided
platforms have multiple competitors even though indirect network effects and
sometimes economies of scale would seem to propel them to monopolies’’ (Evans
2013, p.8). As a result, the exclusionary effect/barriers to entry created by the
propensity of retail MFNs to preclude differentiation based on a low cost/low price
model could be very significant in a multi-sided setting.
3. Facilitating collusion
MFNs by their nature will increase price transparency in a given marketplace,
depending as they do on the exchange of pricing information (directly or indirectly).
In the case of MFNs with auditing rights, the dissemination of competitively
sensitive information is likely to be even more widespread. The very existence of
MFNs can also be used as a signaling strategy between horizontal competitors to
communicate that they do not intend to engage in aggressive price competition,
particularly if a large proportion of the market becomes subject to similar MFNs. In
addition to achieving price transparency, as identified by Butz (1990), the use of
MFN provisions may act as a device by cartel members against customers who may
hold out against price increases and frustrate the cartel through postponing orders
and waiting until one party offers a discount.
Butz (1990) explains this effect in reference to the MFN provisions used in the
U.S. market for turbine generators in the 1960 and 1970s, which were ultimately
stopped by the Justice Department, as explained in reference to United States v.
General Electric Co. The author points out that the adoption of MFN provisions by
GE and Westinghouse had a significant stabilizing effect on the market, eliminating
the price competition which formerly existed in the market despite its oligopolistic
structure. Butz (1990) explains that the MFN provisions may have furthered price
stability not only through making it more costly for the firms to offer discounts but
also leading the customers to refrain from postponing orders in the present as they
could theoretically still benefit from future discounts. The significance of this theory
is highlighted as follows: ‘‘In the conventional explanation, best price provisions
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enhance cooperation between firms at each point in time. Here the provisions enable
a single cartel to collude with itself across time. Best-price provisions could be
commitments to industry rivals, yet they could also serve as commitments to
buyers’’ (Butz 1990, p. 1071).
In the abovementioned United States v. General Electric Co, the (traditional)
retroactive MFN clauses used by GE and White Westinghouse were challenged by
the DOJ based on the grounds that the MFN clauses constituted a facilitating
practice for collusion regarding the prices of turbine generators along with various
other practices including publication of similar and extensive price books. As a
result of the DOJ’s action, the companies agreed to a consent decree whereby they
voluntarily dropped the MFN clauses and committed not to publicly disseminate
price data. In a similar vein, in E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Company v. Federal
Trade Commission, Dupont and Ethyl Corp, the two largest producers in the market
for antiknock additives, used a combination of potential facilitating practices
including advance notices to customers and the press regarding price increases, and
traditional MFN clauses. While the FTC condemned the use of MFN clauses under
Sect. 5 of the FTC Act, this finding was reversed by the Second Circuit, which
noted, inter alia, that Ethyl had adopted the MFN clause while it was the only
producer in the market. The court used this finding to argue that the MFN clause
must have been adopted with a pro-competitive purpose as opposed to facilitating
collusion.
Retail MFN clauses have been associated less with collusion in the antitrust
scrutiny of such cases in comparison to their unilateral effects in terms of
dampening competition and exclusion of rivals. The notable exception in this regard
is the e-books cases in the US and EU which concerned a rather unique set of facts.
In the relevant case, the publishers under investigation were alleged to have engaged
in a horizontal concerted practice to switch to an agency system and refrain from
distributing e-books through a distributor/reseller system. The European Commis-
sion alleged that the publishers exchanged information, directly and through Apple,
as to whether to switch to an agency model with Apple and the key terms of the
agency arrangements, including retail MFN clauses. The publishers were concerned
with Amazon’s resale of e-books below the wholesale prices as a loss leader to
facilitate the sale of its Kindle device, which hurt the publishers’ profits in other
channels such as printed books (Johnson 2014).
In its preliminary assessment, the Commission reasoned that the mutual use of
such retail MFN clauses would have functioned as a ‘‘commitment device’’ as they
could have meant significantly lower revenues for the publishers unless they put a
stop to lower pricing by Amazon or other retailers proceeding under the ‘‘resale’’
model. (Case COMP/39.847—E-Books 2013a, para. 38) Apple was implicated in
the concerted action between the publishers as it made the concerted practice
possible by disclosing information to each of the retailers about the others’
intentions. The resulting commitments included a ban on the use of retail MFNs, as
well as ‘‘wholesale’’ MFNs (concerning the publishers’ wholesale prices to retailers)
and ‘‘commission/revenue share’’ MFNs (concerning the level of commission/
revenue share received by a retailer under the agency model) (Case COMP/
39.847—E-Books 2013a, paras. 102, 138).
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This case was also subject to antitrust enforcement in the US, with the investigation
reaching a similar conclusion. In United States v. Apple, Inc., the federal district court
held after a full trial on the merits that Apple’s pricing provisions with e-book
publishers, the same ones mentioned above, violated US competition laws. (The
district court’s decision is currently under appeal.) The court found that the publishing
agreements between Apple and five publishing houses constituted a per se illegal
price-fixing conspiracy, orchestrated by Apple. The court found that the effect of the
retail MFNs in this scheme was to incentivize the publishers to force Amazon and
other e-book sellers to accept an agency business model that allowed the publishers to
raise retail prices. In the litigated case against Apple, the court did not need to address
the legality of MFNs as a general matter, focusing as it did on the issue of the alleged
price-fixing conspiracy, of which the MFN was merely one part. However, as part of
the overall investigation, the Department of Justice obtained consent decrees from the
publisher defendants that require the publishers to terminate any contracts with e-book
retailers that contain price MFNs. As in Europe, the publishers were also prohibited
from entering into e-book retailer agreements that contain MFNs for 5 years. A federal
district court approved these consent agreements, concluding that the interoperation of
the agency contracts, retail price MFNs and the collusive behavior together constituted
a violation of the antitrust laws, though any one of those acts did not necessary violate
the law by itself.
2.2.2 Factors presenting significant anti-competitive concerns
As provided above, the anti-competitive potential of MFN clauses may be magnified
depending on market dynamics. In addition to providing a solid theoretical
background, through setting out such specific factors, a model guideline would be
able to concentrate the resources of competition authorities on areas of increased
risk and also provide guidance on what to avoid for businesses and practitioners.
This would be particularly useful for general legal practitioners or officials of
undertaking looking for concrete guidance as opposed to theory. As a result, below
we present a discussion regarding certain characteristics of MFN clauses with that
have been singled out as presenting a higher chance of anti-competitive effects.
Where more than one of the below factors are present together, or the magnitude
of one anti-competitive factor (such as very high market shares of the parties, or
particularly high penalties for discounts), in principle, it will be difficult for pro-
competitive effects to balance the negative effects on competition. Based on the
existing academic literature as well as the positions taken by the authorities in a
variety of jurisdictions which are outlined above, the following factors may be set
out as presenting particularly high risks to competition:
1. MFN-Plus provisions
MFN-plus provisions go beyond guaranteeing a buyer equally advantageous
terms as those offered to other buyers, but guarantee that the terms offered to the
relevant buyer will be better than those offered to other customers. MFN-plus
provisions are more likely to result in harm to consumers (Salop and Scott Morton
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2013) since they are likely to involve instances where a buyer may even accept
higher costs of input in order to impose even greater costs on its rivals and therefore
gain a competitive edge.
As MFN-plus provisions are centered on increasing the relative costs of
competitors, the associated risks of exclusionary effects on competitors will be
particularly high. Furthermore, MFN-plus provisions are unlikely to satisfy the
condition of restricting competition to the extent that is indispensable for the
attainment of the proposed efficiencies such as provided under Article 101(3) of the
TFEU. This is because any of the efficiencies outlined above could likely be
achieved through a regular MFN clause.
2. Retroactive MFN clauses
In comparison to contemporaneous MFN clauses where the seller is only
responsible for matching lower prices it offers which are contemporaneous with the
MFN-holder’s purchase (or at least within a relatively short time frame), retroactive
MFN clauses (where the seller must provide the same low price to past sales) may
pose greater risk for competition. In effect, the more ‘‘retroactive’’ an MFN clause
becomes, the greater the number of offers which will be covered—and therefore the
greater the ‘‘tax’’ on a discount and the resulting effect in terms of dampening
competition. Similarly, the ability of cartel members to stabilize the cartel, or a
monopolist to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis buyers who hold out for better
prices will be dependent on the MFNs being retroactive.
That said, retroactive MFNs may also result in important efficiencies. For
example, the potential for MFN clauses to effectively remedy the problem of
customers holding out for better terms to the extent that a business may not reach
the critical mass of customers to launch itself depends on the retroactivity of the
MFN.
As a result, an analysis on retroactive MFN clauses will require a balancing of
these potentially conflicting effects.
3. MFN clauses with penalties
While a penalty may provide certain benefits in terms of assuring compliance,
given the increase in the disincentive to discount—and therefore the dampening
effect on competition—as a result of the penalty, it is unlikely that this would be
enough to justify the inclusion of a penalty.
4. Large supplier/large buyer with market power/highly concentrated markets
Predictably, the risks to competition are higher where the relevant parties to an
MFN arrangement have high market shares (Salop and Scott Morton 2013). This is
true for both the risks of collusion and price rigidity in the market (where the market
share of the supplier will be particularly relevant) as well as the risk of exclusionary
effects on the competitors of the buyer (where the market share of the buyer will be
particularly relevant) (Salop and Scott Morton 2013, Jacobson and Weick 2012). As
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a corollary, a high level of concentration in the relevant market similarly
exacerbates the anti-competitive effects, particularly the risk of collusion in the
upstream market. Conversely, where there is a relatively high number of suppliers,
both the chances for a buyer to exclude competitors through raising their cost of
input and the ability of suppliers to achieve a collusive outcome are significantly
lessened.
In light of the above, a guideline could provide cut-off market shares where an
MFN clause would be presumed anti-competitive, shifting the burden of proof on
the relevant undertakings to prove otherwise. If such cut-off market shares are
provided, they should be very high to be on the conservative side.
5. Wide-spread use of MFN clauses in a market
The wide-spread use of MFN clauses in an industry in such a way that parallel
restraints cover a substantial part of the market would also result in cumulative
effects which magnify the anti-competitive effects of MFN clauses (Salop and Scott
Morton 2013; Cernak and Chaiken (2013)). This is particularly true for risks of
collusion and price rigidity. Where all or a substantial part of the suppliers in a
market commit to making it more costly to engage in discounts, this would
considerably stabilize any potential collusive arrangements. Similarly, the mutual
use of MFN clauses would be more effective in terms of communicating a general
intent to refrain from engaging in price competition among market participants.
Even without collusion, the use of MFN clauses in a way that they cover a
substantial part of the market could result in significant price rigidity through
making discounts more unlikely with respect to a substantial amount of transactions
in the relevant market.
The enforcement trends toward MFN clauses demonstrate the significance of
parallel usage of MFN clauses. In particular, the Commission’s enforcement efforts
such as the theater digitalization case, and the e-books case focus on the cumulative
effect of parallel usages of MFN clauses in the relevant industry. The FCO has also
noted the industry-wide use of retail MFN clauses in its HRS decision, stating that
the use of MFNs by different platform operators strengthen the anti-competitive
effects in the market. Indeed, the FCO noted that given the combined market shares
of HRS, Booking.com and Expedia, the MFN clauses covered nearly 90 % of the
relevant market (FCO 2014d, para. 163).
In parallel with the above, a model Guideline could provide a cut-off where MFN
clauses would be presumed anti-competitive if parallel networks of MFN clauses
cover a certain percentage of the market.
6. Wide retail MFNs
In the above mentioned PMI Market Investigation by the CMA, the authority
reasoned that, while networks of narrow MFNs (covering only the direct channel of
the supplier) could also potentially have the effect of softening competition between
retailers where suppliers conduct significant amounts of sales through the direct
channel, in general wide MFNs (extending to sales over other platforms/resellers as
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well) had a stronger negative effect on inhibiting price competition between retailers.
Similarly, wide retail MFNs resulted in exclusionary effects toward existing rivals and
would-be entrants through precluding product differentiation through a low-cost/low-
price model. Wide retail MFNs were also found to result in relatively low level of
additional efficiencies over and above those produced by narrow retail MFNs in terms
of engendering consumer trust or prevention of free riding (CMA 2014).
While these dynamics could change based on the market in question, the above
findings suggest that wide retail MFNs generally pose greater competition law
concerns.11
2.3 Efficiencies and justifications
We argue that a model guideline should discuss the particular efficiencies which can
be achieved through the use of MFN clauses and the specific contexts where MFN
clauses may have particularly strong pro-competitive effects. Particularly, in the
case of EU law, highlighting potential pro-competitive effects would provide
guidance for the first element of individual exemption analyses under Article 101(3)
of the TFEU where the awarding of an individual exemption is predicated on the
relevant agreement’s ‘‘contributing to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress.’’
The existing academic literature provides a consensus as to certain benefits which
may be achieved through the use of MFN clauses.
1. Efficient contract structures/encouraging relationship-specific investments
In cases of long term contracts where future market conditions are hard to
predict, both the buyer and supplier are legitimately concerned about being locked
into a deal with potentially disadvantageous terms (Salop and Scott Morton 2013).
The adoption of a (traditional) MFN clause solves this problem through introducing
greater flexibility to the contractual relationship. Through being assured that it will
not receive worse terms than the future customers of the relevant supplier, who will
be better informed about the market conditions then prevailing, the buyer mitigates
the risks associated with unpredictability and therefore may be willing to engage in
deals which may otherwise not take place. The supplier also benefits as it will likely
be able to offer higher prices than it otherwise would and therefore decrease its own
risks of being locked into a disadvantageous deal.
The combination of a long-term contract with an MFN clause also prevents
opportunistic behavior by a transaction party after the other undertakes a
11 Other examples of antitrust cases where there has been a differentiation between narrow and wide
retail MFNs are the investigation by a variety of national competition authorities concerning the retail
MFN clauses used by the online hotel reservation platforms Booking.com and Expedia. On April 21,
2015, the French, Italian and Swedish competition authorities accepted binding commitments from
Booking.com whereby Booking.com agreed to drop its retail MFN clauses in regard to conditions offered
through other online reservation platforms. The hotels would also be able to offer better sales conditions
through offline channels such as their reception desks. However, Booking.com retained its ‘‘narrow retail
MFN’’ vis-à-vis the conditions offered through the hotels’ own webpage. See http://news.booking.com/
bookingcom-announces-support-of-new-commitments-in-europe.
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relationship specific investment. This way, the buyer is assured that it will not be
disadvantaged vis-à-vis other buyers as a result of the commitment it has made
through undertaking a relationship-specific investment, while at the same time
retaining price flexibility in the relationship to adapt to future market conditions.
Various papers studying the use of MFN clauses or similar structures in natural gas
contracts support the above discussion. Mulherin (1986) who has analyzed the use of
MFN clauses and take-or-pay provisions in the natural gas industry based on contracts in
the 1940–1954 period concludes that the best explanation for the use of these provisions
in the given case seems to be a desire to minimize transaction costs through introducing a
contractual structure which prevents opportunistic behavior by the pipeline while still
allowing ‘‘timely adjustment’’ to changing market conditions (Mulherin 1986,
112–113). Crocker and Lyon (1994) similarly provide empirical support on the use of
MFNs to introduce price flexibility in long term contracts with high and relation-specific
fixed costs without risking opportunistic behavior, as opposed to such clauses being
motivated by a desire to facilitate coercion.12 Canes and Norman (1986) also describe
the role of MFN clauses in the natural gas industry in a similar manner: long term
contracts encourage investments with large fixed-costs, while the MFN clauses in turn
provide a low-cost mechanism to adapt the contract prices to market conditions.
Baker and Chevalier (2013) and Van der Veer (2013) note that MFN clauses are
in general an effective way for a buyer undertaking a relation-specific investment
that it will not be the subject of subsequent opportunistic conduct and therefore be in
a competitive disadvantage, without a specific reference to a long term contract. As
long as the MFN protection stays in effect, the investing party is assured that it will
be treated equally with any other buyer.
2. Reduced transaction costs/agreement continuity
Traditional MFNs may lead to efficiencies by reducing the transaction costs
associated with bargaining. The potential of MFN clauses to reduce transaction
costs is generally recognized (Baker and Chevalier 2013; Van der Veer 2013).
Returning to the healthcare example, it is expensive and time-consuming for
insurers and medical providers to negotiate the complex pricing of medical services.
Periodically, difficult negotiations even lead to contracts expiring before a new one
is in place, leading to disruptions in medical care for patients. The same disruptions
have occurred in the television market (Samuelson et al. 2012). An MFN could
reduce the frequency of bargaining and therefore its associated costs. In effect, the
buyer with the MFN is free-riding on the bargaining costs of the other buyers. In
markets with volatile, complex or uncertain pricing, the reduced transaction costs
could be significant and, again, potentially passed onto consumers (Cernak and
Chaiken (2013)). Overall, where the pricing parameters are especially complex and
therefore bargaining costs are especially high, MFN clauses can reduce costs.
12 Based on Crocker and Lyon (1994)’s data, in the context of the natural gas sector which is
characterized by low market power for suppliers (i.e. well operators) and high market power for buyers
(i.e. gas pipeline operators), the use of MFN clauses increases as the number of buyers increase even
though the use of MFN clauses should have been more prominent in more concentrated settings if the
main rationale for adoption was to facilitate collusion.
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3. Prevent delays/hold-outs
Baker and Chevalier (2013) also describe a scenario in which a (traditional) MFN
could reduce transaction delays, by resolving what could be termed the ‘‘hold out’’
problem, or by discouraging buyers from delaying purchase in hopes of a better
deal. The authors describe a hypothetical in which a land developer wants to build a
project that requires a minimum number of landowners to sell their property. Each
landowner should want to be the last to sell, since that will increase their bargaining
leverage, which may lead to hold-outs. An MFN would resolve this by guaranteeing
to earlier sellers that they will receive the best price offered to the later sellers.
Similarly, where market dynamics are such that buyers may be tempted to hold-
out in hopes of receiving better terms in the future, the use of an MFN clause can be
used to mitigate such hold-out problems through guaranteeing equally advantageous
terms to those making early commitments (Baker and Chevalier 2013; Van der Veer
2013; Salop and Scott Morton 2013). The efficiencies created by mitigating hold-out
problems may be particularly high where an initial level of early purchases is
necessary for subsequent network effects or high-cost relation-specific investments
(Salop and Scott Morton 2013).
4. Platform and brand value
An additional justification for MFNs discussed in the literature relates to
encouraging investments in a brand or platform. Samuelson et al. (2012) note that
‘‘in two-sided markets, the structural integrity of the platform is paramount’’
(Samuelson et al. 2012, p.3). However, the users of the platform can affect its value
and reputation. MFNs could prevent the value of the platform from being damaged
through the appearance of disadvantageous offers, or some other disadvantage for
using the relevant platform. Samuelson et al. (2012) provide the example of
merchants disadvantaging the use of a payment card which may significantly affect
the popularity of the relevant payment card. The authors further argue that given the
indirect network effects in multi-sided markets, the reductions in the number of
customers occurring as a result of such disadvantages would further reduce the
value of the platform for the customers on the other side (i.e. the merchants in the
above example).
The appearance of a disadvantage could be particularly damaging to the business
model of certain platforms such as online travel agents or price comparison websites
which were at issue in certain important antitrust investigations regarding retail
MFNs in Europe. Since such platforms create value for consumers through reducing
transaction costs, including those of searching at other sites, consumers may no
longer be willing to use the platform if they perceive that they still need to engage in
further research to find better offers. The price comparison websites investigated in
the CMA’s Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation tried to rely on this
defense, stating that ‘‘if consumers did not have confidence that PCWs were
comparing prices, consumers might stop using them altogether’’ (CMA 2014, 8.90).
This justification was accepted only to a limited degree by the CMA. The
authority found that ‘‘narrow’’ retail MFNs ensuring that price comparison website
Eur J Law Econ (2016) 42:129–155 149
123
would not receive less advantageous quotes than offered in an insurer’s own website
were pro-competitive in that they engendered consumer trust and reduced the need
for consumers to visit insurers’ own websites (CMA 2014, 8.97). However, the
authority took the position that wide-MFNs (i.e. those ensuring the best quote across
all platforms) provided little additional value. The CMA reasoned that, in that
particular case, a significant number of users already tended to multi-home to a
certain extent (i.e. search in multiple PCWs to compare offers).
5. Prevention of free-riding
In cases involving retail MFN clauses, platform operators have made the
argument that retail MFN clauses, which ensure the platform operator that the retail
price offered by the supplier is at least as advantageous as that which it offers on
other platforms, may create efficiency through preventing low cost/low quality
platform from free-riding on the marketing/promotion activities and high quality
services by other platforms.
In its investigation of the online hotel booking platform, HRS, the German FCO,
did not accept this defense by the platform as it reasoned that the losses due to free-
riding were likely to be low given that the online platforms’ investments were
generally not contract-specific (FCO 2013c, para. 204). The FCO posited that non-
contract investments in quality would not be lost as a result of free riding since they
improved the general image of the platform (FCO 2013c, para. 205). The agency
also ruled that the ‘‘billboard effect’’ whereby hotels exploit the portal to then attract
the booking to their own websites via cheaper rates would not be a serious concern
for the German market.
It is important to note that, despite taking this position in the specific case of
HRS, the FCO accepted that retail MFNs could improve distribution through
eliminating free riding, thereby fulfilling the first condition under an individual
exemption analysis under Article 101 (3) TFEU in its Vertical Restraints in the
Internet Economy background paper. In particular, it described the risk of free
riding in the following way:
‘‘Free riding activities by dealers or service providers that also use the services
of a platform could take the following form: the dealers or providers could use
the investments made by the platform, which include contract-specific
investments such as the editing of their offer and unspecific investments such
as the listing and sorting of offers (‘bulletin board effect’) and investments
into the popularity of the platform which increase visitor traffic and enhance
consumer trust. Before a business transaction is concluded they could induce
their customers, e.g. end consumers, to go to their own internet shop or
another sales channel with a lower commission, thus avoiding the payment of
the commission due for the services provided by the platform’’ (FCO 2013a,
p.25)
The PCWs in the CMA’s PMI Market Investigation also used the prevention of
free riding as a justification for retail MFNs. The CMA did not find the prospect of
free riding by other platforms to be a significant concern therefore it did not find that
150 Eur J Law Econ (2016) 42:129–155
123
wide-MFNs had a pro-competitive contribution in this regard (CMA 2014, 8.106).
With respect to narrow-MFNs, the agency reasoned that there was some risk of free
riding by PMI providers themselves, especially as the search results indicated the
provider of the most advantageous quote. In this respect, the authority speculated
that this risk could be dealt with through alternative means such as ‘‘quote poaching
clauses’’ and alternative charging models, but ultimately did not see the need to
reach a final position as it already refrained from condemning narrow-MFNs (CMA
2014, 8.100-101).
6. Lower prices
In certain specific circumstances, the MFN might operate to lower average
market prices. For example, as Samuelson et al. (2012) note, in markets where a
small buyer might be able to secure a lower price than large buyers (perhaps
because the seller has marginal excess capacity), and prices are not transparent, an
MFN might allow the lower price to diffuse further across the market. Note,
however, that this requires that it would be profit-maximizing for the seller to offer
the lower price to the small buyer, knowing that it will then have to offer the lower
price to the buyer with the MFN as well. In the same vein, where it is the case that a
smaller buyer, rather than a large one, which is protected by the MFN, the ‘‘tax’’ on
discounting would be relatively small and therefore the supplier could likely still
provide discounts to large buyers with greater market power, which would be passed
on the small buyer as a result of the MFN
2.4 Safe harbors
As discussed above, one of the most important contributions to be provided by a
guideline would be to identify certain safe harbors where the use of MFN clauses
would be presumed legal. The following factors are good candidates for safe harbors:
1. Lack of market power/low market share
The use of MFN clauses is unlikely to present competition law concerns where
the parties to an MFN lack market power (Salop and Scott Morton 2013). As
provided above, where the supplier provides a discount to any particular party, the
existence of MFN arrangements forces the supplier to provide the same discount to
the party protected by the MFN—thereby acting as a disincentive for such selective
reductions in price. However, this disincentive is likely to be low where the relevant
buyer only has a small market presence. In other words, the ‘‘disincentive’’ created
by the need to offer a discount to a small player with a relatively low level of
purchases would be less likely to prevent suppliers from offering discounts
altogether. In fact, where MFN clauses are only awarded to small market players,
this may well have the overall effect of lowering the prices in the downstream
market through ensuring that small players also enjoy the discounts provided to
larger firms. Where the supplier also constitutes a small share of the supply in the
market, this would make the prospect of any negative effects on the overall price
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level in the relevant market even more unlikely, as alternative suppliers who are not
bound by similar arrangements could meet the excess demand and offer discounts to
capture business from the supplier bound by the MFN.
In light of this consideration, a model guideline should provide that MFN clauses
are to be considered legal where the market share of both the buyer and seller are
below a certain threshold. The exception to such a safe harbor would be where
widespread parallel usages of MFN clauses by many market players add up to
covering a substantial amount of the market.13 In such a case, even where the
disincentive on discounting created by individual arrangements may be small, the
combined effect may still be sufficient to promote price rigidity in the relevant
market.
2. Unconcentrated markets
Similar to the above, MFN clauses are unlikely to lead to harms to competition
where the level of concentration in both markets is low (Salop and Scott Morton
2013). As such, a safe harbor similar to the above could also be designed based on
concentration levels of the relevant markets (e.g. in terms of Herfindahl–Hirschman
Index or HHI figures),14 or a safe harbor based on a combination of market share
and level of concentration in the market could be envisioned.
Similar to the above, the safe harbor treatment would need to be removed where
widespread parallel usages of MFN clauses end up covering a substantial part of the
market.
3 Conclusion
As discussed above, the effects of MFN clauses in the level of competition in the
relevant markets and the resulting antitrust consequences are particularly complex.
This complexity is in turn reflected in the case law of the courts and antitrust
enforcement agencies, which have dealt with the resulting antitrust concerns based
on the dynamics of each case as they have found them. Especially coupled with the
scarcity of relevant precedent in many jurisdictions, this makes a case-by-case
approach disadvantageous from the perspective of businesses seeking to utilize
MFN clauses in their agreements, and desiring to reach legal certainty regarding the
relevant antitrust consequences.
13 This exception would be similar in character to Article 6 of VBER which provides that ‘‘the
Commission may by regulation declare that, where parallel networks of similar vertical restraints cover
more than 50 % of a relevant market, this Regulation shall not apply to vertical agreements containing
specific restraints relating to that market’’.
14 To assess the concentration level via the HHI levels, one would need to calculate the squares of the
individual market shares of all the firms in the market and add the relevant figures. For instance, the
European Commission considers that in a market where the HHI is below 1,000, the market would not be
highly concentrated (please refer to the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings).
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As defended above, a guideline that brings together the accumulated guidance
regarding the competitive consequences of MFN clauses based on both the legal
cases from different jurisdictions and the economic effects of MFNs discussed in
academic literature could provide important benefits. Particularly, such a document
could provide practical guidance and a level of legal certainty through proposing
safe harbors as well as noting the particularly risky situations to be avoided.
In the above sections, we provide the outline of such a guideline document.
While there could be variations in terms of structure and content, we believe that
secondary legislation which can provide the desired level of guidance should
generally cover the point outlined in Section II above. The creation of safe harbors
is particularly important since, as shown above, MFN clauses are often adopted with
pro-competitive purposes in mind and the negative effects on competition are
unlikely to be significant in situations where neither the supplier nor the buyer
possess market power, and the effects of individual MFN arrangements are not
magnified through networks of similar arrangements covering significant parts of
the relevant market. Furthermore, through providing a comprehensive discussion of
potential pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of MFNs, the existence of a
comprehensive guideline could significantly aid case-by-case analyses even where
no safe harbors apply.
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